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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper seeks to present an analysis of some issues raised in the debate on 
the future of capitalism by influential social democrats in recent years [Agleitta 
(1999); Habermas (1999); Rorty (1998)]. We begin with a brief description of 
capitalism's genesis, its characteristics and its need for moral legitimising and 
proceed to a slightly more extended discussion of capitalist processes at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century. The paper concludes with an assessment of 
initiatives proposed by social democratic thinkers such as Agleitta, Habermas and 
Rorty to strengthen capitalism and realise social democratic objectives—the 
universalisation of freedom and the promotion of liberal justices in rights centric 
societies.   
 
II.  ORIGINS 
Contrary to the claims of neo and new classical economists e.g. [Hayek 
(1988)] capitalism has a history. Capitalist markets invariably emerge from non 
capitalist social formations – this is true even of the United States where for example 
Jaynes (1986, Chp. 15) has documented the legislative acts and policy measures 
adopted to create a labour market after the abolition of slavery in the decades after 
the civil war. The US government after 1865 enforced a legal political system that 
effectively disenfranchised the blacks, reduced their economic power and shaped the 
labour market. There was little “spontaneity” in the development of capital labour 
relations in the American south in the second half of the nineteenth century. In the 
late twentieth century legislative and policy-making measures adopted by the World 
Trade Organisation are similarly constructing technology markets by universalising 
the US patent system. Once again there is nothing spontaneous, automatic or natural 
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about the processes of legitimisation which reduce the access of developing countries 
to the new technologies. 
Capitalist markets and capitalist property forms are thus historical 
constructions in the specific sense that laws and practices are “required” for their 
emergence and their sustainence. Outcomes of course need not have been as intended 
but a certain easily definable ethos motivated the actions which led to the 
development of capitalist property. Historically constructed markets cannot be 
viewed as natural outcomes of myriad unrelated events or attributed to the natural 
evolution of technology [Polanyi (1947)]. 
The historical political construction of the capitalist property form rules out 
the possibility of its defence on grounds sanctioned by natural law.
1 Markets are 
premised on the existence of morally sanctioned property rights—rights about 
ownership, exchange and unrequited transfer. Conceptions of ownership with respect 
to human bodies, life forms, water and land have varied among societies and there is 
nothing “natural” about any particular answer to property rights legitimising 
questions. Similarly, a property-defining authority must be morally sanctioned. Since 
moral sanctioning requires an exercise of political power, the state necessarily plays 
a major role in defining and enforcing the legitimisation of a particular conception of 
property rights. 
Capitalist markets structure price-based decision-making between anonymous 
individuals. Unlike feudalism, social positions do not define exchange relationships. 
Feudal exchange was contextualised by a set of rules and traditions which left little 
scope for price based choices. Similarly, exchanges between citizen and government 
of even the most mature capitalist state in history do not constitute a market 
relationship because a citizen cannot directly choose the services he receives or the 
taxes he pays to government. Non-market exchanges are, however, increasingly 
exceptional in capitalist civil societies and price-based exchange among anonymous 
buyers and sellers usually dominate. Market relations are the main determinant of the 
pace and pattern of economic activity. As Polanyi puts it, “(capitalism) is the running 
of society as an adjunct to the market. Instead of the economy being embedded in 
social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system” (1947, p. 57). 
So defined, capitalism is seen to be necessarily spatially and temporally specific.
2  
The continued dominance of the capitalist property form requires that 
legitimate power be transferred to those who can best organise production and 
exchange for accelerated accumulation, directly (i.e. in the circuit of capital) or 
indirectly (in the super-structure).
3  This implies a universalisation of the wage 
form—for it is the wage form which structurally relates rewards to efforts. 
1Non capitalist property forms also cannot be so defended—there is nothing “natural” about 
feudal or socialist property forms: their defence must also be premised on moral grounds.  
2Thus, we can state that capitalism probably did not exist anywhere in the world in 1066. It did 
exist in North East England in 1858 and was abolished in the Khost province of Afghanistan in 1997. 
3In spheres such as politics, culture, scientific research which facilitate accumulation. Social Democratic Reform  1213
Capitalist property is not private because it is dedicated to accumulation. 
Control of this property is effectively vested in individuals who possess the skills and 
knowledge to accelerate efficient accumulation. They “manage” capitalist property 
on behalf of its formal owners and rewards to both “owners” and “managers” 
correspond to success achieved in the use of resources to accelerate efficient 
accumulation. The wage form is universalised in two ways (a) accelerated efficient 
accumulation implies increased centralisation and concentration of capital and hence 
a reduction in the section of the population which is not dependent on waged or 
salaried labour, as a main source of its incomes and (b) even these property 
“owning” individuals become crucially dependent on the skills of the dominant 
salaried “managers” to accumulate efficiently.
 4 As Meszaros writes “(T)he capital 
system is (the) first one in history which constitutes itself as an unexceptional and 
irresistible totaliser. This characteristic makes the system more dynamic than all the 
earlier modes of social…. control. But the price that must be paid for this 
incommensurable totalising dynamism is… the loss of control over the decision-
making process. This applies even to the richest capitalists for no matter how many 
controlling shares they own, their power of control within the framework of the 
capital system is quite negligible. They must obey the objective imperatives of the 
system just like every one else or suffer the consequence and go out of business”. 
(1995, p. 41-42). 
Universalising wage labour is thus an aspect of the dominance of markets—
the late twentieth century has seen significant growth in market dominance. But 
markets continue to be regulated. The state plays a role as both regulator and 
supporter of markets. Both regulatory and support systems have their origins in 
national and local histories. It is therefore legitimate to speak of the co-existence of 
several capitalisms—several market dominant social formations—in the early 21st 
century. Moreover, the forms and intensity of regulation and support continue to 
change so we can also legitimately speak of a continuous construction of capitalisms. 
In the twenty first century, capitalist governments or state agencies are not the only 
sources of market regulation—much regulation and reconstruction of markets is 
undertaken by the monopolists, monopsonists, oligopolists and oligopsonists who 
normally dominate capitalism. These “private” organisations seek to capture the 
“public” resources and institutions which are involved in market regulation and 
construction. Interaction between “public” and “private” agents establishes a 
historically specific regulatory regime which defines the scope of capitalist markets 
and the manner in which they perform their functions. The development of 
historically specific regulatory regimes may involve a transition from non-capitalist 
to capitalist property forms or a transition from one capitalist property form to 
another. It is the duty of the capitalist state 
5 to de-legitimise and obstruct a transition 
4“Owners” would find that they are holding valueless bonds and shares unless managers succeed 
in ensuring high profitability. 
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from capitalist to non-capitalist forms of property. This illustrates that capitalist 
property, is a historical not a natural construct. It necessarily requires moral 
legitimisation. 
Such a justification has been provided by Hegel. He sees capitalist society and 
the state as the final stage in human history. This final order of universal permanent 
capital reflected the self-realisation of the World Spirit. For Hegel, historical time was 
a relentless forward movement realising the idea of freedom. Hegel’s thought has 
Smithian roots. He took for granted the hereafter permanence of capitalist civil 
society.
6 Hegel’s “cunning of Reason” is simply another—more profound—
conceptualisation of Smith’s “ invisible hand” 
7—for it represents the eternalised 
standpoint of capitalist civil society and nothing else. It was Hegel who wrote, “Europe 
is absolutely the end of history” (1956, p. 103). Transition to a non-capitalist social 
formation is not only unreal but irrational and the ground is cleared for the neo 
classical equilibrium analysis which admits of only marginal adjustments to the finally 
attained universal capitalist order which ‘is the destiny of Reason itself’ [Hegel (1956), 
p. 107]. The mass slaughter of the Red Indians, the colonisation of the East, the 
dehumanisation of an uprooted peasantry in Europe—these are viewed as moments in 
the realisation of this ultimate triumph of Reason. Opposing capitalism was thus 
violating the requirements of Reason itself and what else could be more reprehensible? 
Hegel succinctly sums up his argument identifying Reason with the 
movement of capital. “By a dialectical advance subjective self-seeking turns into 
mediation by the particular through the universal with the result that each man in 
earning, producing and enjoying on his own account is eo-ipso  producing and 
earning for the enjoyment of everyone else”.
 8 The compulsion which brings this 
about is rooted in the complex interdependence of each on all and it now presents 
itself to each as universal permanent capital [Hegel (1942), p. 129-30].  
In section 200 of his Philosophy of Right Hegel explicitly justified capitalist 
civil society on the ethical ground that participating in general wealth through one's 
skill (labour) is determined by access to capital. Hence, he regards capitalism as an 
ethically grounded order which is legitimately universalisable and necessary to the 
realisation of freedom. A moral social order dominated by ever expanding capital is 
a “rational necessity of freedom”. In the Hegelian system, despite a recognition of its 
“accidental, contingent” historical roots 
9 permanent capital is regarded as a fully de-
historicised entity: hence the “irrationality” of moral/social projects seeking 
transcendence of capitalist processes. The capitalist mode of production and its 
associated inequalities in the distribution of power and income is quite explicitly 
defended by Hegel on grounds of rationality (1942, pp. 129-30). 
6Quite explicitly identifying civil society with the market in The Philosophy of Right.       
7Or Kant’s “plan of nature” or Vico’s “providence”. 
8Echoes of Smith. 
9These are mentioned no less than six times in sec. 200 of The Philosophy of Right. Social Democratic Reform  1215
It is thus legitimate to avoid the problem of capitalism’s historical origins 
because in the Hegelian and neo-classical perception, capitalist order is a rational 
necessity for freedom. This view can be rejected on the basis of two quite separate 
grounds. We will consider each briefly. 
Marxists accuse Hegel of misrepresenting the nature of “the complex 
interdependence of each on all”. In the Marxist view, this “complex interdependence” 
does not invalidate the need to transcend the class division of capitalist civil society. In 
this view, capital is a historically transcendable property relationship which dominates 
individuals (both labourers and capitalists). The class struggle is the essential modus 
vivendi for the transcendence of capitalist order and for the realisation of freedom. The 
existence of capital makes freedom impossible: for according to the Marxists there is 
an absence of reciprocity in capitalist civil society which is dominated by a structurally 
safeguarded exploitative hierarchic self-seeking particularity and the contradictions it 
generates inhibits freedom. It creates chaos not harmony. Capitalism frustrates the 
quest for freedom through alienation in the process of production. The inherently crisis 
ridden character of capitalism demonstrates its irrationality as a means for the 
realisation of freedom [Marx (1954) and Meszaros (1970)]. 
A more fundamental rejection of capitalist rationality—its “universal 
permanence”—is embodied in the Christian and Islamic repudiation of freedom as an 
individual or social aspiration. Christianity and Islam ground moral and ethical order 
on the duty to surrender to God’s will and seek to promote the type of virtuous lives 
which articulate and actualise this surrender: Islamic and Christian public orders are 
virtue—not welfare-centric. The Christian-Islamic rejection of the universal 
permanence of capital is an aspect of their rejection of the eternity of the world. 
As Tawney (1959) shows, capitalism systematically undermines Christian 
virtue. Before the Enlightenment economics was subsumed by ethics and ethics by 
theology. 
10 Economic evaluations were subject to religious norms and Christianity 
and Islam emphatically reject the claim that the attainment of material well-being 
(i.e. maximising the present discounted value of consumerables in a finite life time) 
can be a valid criteria for evaluating success. As Tawney writes, “the philosophy of 
(welfare) is a negation of any system of thought or morals which can….be described 
as Christian. Compromise is impossible between the church of Christ and the 
idolatry of wealth” (1959, p. 280). 
The Christian—Islamic rejection of capitalism
11 centres on the 
universalisation of usury and the disappearance of the just price within capitalist 
10Theology was grounded on a specifically Christian-Islamic metaphysics which provided a moral 
base for ethical evaluation.  
11Even in a puritanical text such as Pilgrims Progress Christian and Faithful (i.e. Momin) are 
shown to suffer persecution together in Vanity Fair (which may be interpreted as the public order of 
capital). Faithful is martyred in Vanity Fair [Bunyan (1987), pp. 85–87]. For an interpretation of Vanity 
Fair see Sharrock (1966, pp. 71–90). This illustrates the common stance taken by Islam and Christianity 
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order [Tawney (1959), p. 48–67; Thanvi (1934), pp. 117–149]. This leads to the 
dominance of the vices of avarice (accumulation) and covetousness (competition) in 
the life of the individual and of society. Public orders and private lives become 
forgetful of being and of death and therefore incapable of love. 
Accepting capital as “permanent universal” thus depends upon: 
  • Continued forgetfulness of death and of being and rejection of Christian 
Islamic conception of virtue and of the triviality of this world. This implies 
the continued hegemony of what Raz calls “the morality of freedom”. 
  • Continued acceptance of income and power distributional inequalities of 
capitalist order as non-transcendable; (but subject to mediation). 
  • Continued acceptance of capital’s ability to expand the realm of freedom for 
its subjects both in civil society and in the state.  
 
III.  PROCESS 
The starting point for understanding capitalist process should of course be 
mainstream economic theory. Since the late 1970s, there have been several important 
methodological advances in mainstream theory and as Fine puts it “ the political is 
being put back into economic analysis” (1997, p. 145), through for example segmented 
labour market theory and analysis of rent seeking behaviour. But such broadening of 
scope does not amount to a departure from methodological individualism. The 
“giveness” of preferences
12 and the compulsion to optimise are retained as underlying 
assumptions of household behaviour, educational choice and trade union action. 
Methodological individualism now occupies those sub-disciplines (development and 
urban and labour economics for example) from which it was previously (partially) 
excluded. The state itself is (absurdly) viewed as an individual with given preferential 
trade offs between potential policy outcomes. Institutional economics has also 
developed theories explaining the collective behaviour of optimising agents. 
Endogenous growth theory has also sought to open up the black box of the 
technological residual in a typical Solow-Dennison type production function. This 
has partially legitimised “capacity building” policy initiatives at the micro and macro 
levels – without calling into question the relevance of rational expectations “ in the 
last instance”. The emphasis laid on the role of human capital [Lucas (1988)], 
producer durables and “ideas” creates a possibility of going beyond equilibrium 
analysis and developing a deeper understanding of (optimising) choices. But the 
policy prescriptions of endogenous growth theory have not been validated by 
empirical evidence.
13 As Ruttan argues, why “capability building is more successful 
12And often also of production possibilities. 
13Thus as is now widely recognised East Asian and Soviet growth was sourced by an accumulation 
of physical resources not an increase in factor productivity. Despite emphasis on openness and human 
capacity building growth in the OECD during the last two decades has remained low. Empirical studies have 
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in specific cases is not adequately explained by endogenous growth theory. It does 
not have the capacity to reach behind the “proximate” causes of growth and 
understand “pre-conditions” and “take off” stages (or processes)” (1998, pp. 24-25). 
It is the commitment to methodological individualism (commitment to the 
“giveness” of preferences and the “universality” of optimising behaviour) which is 
the dominant constraint on the indigenous growth theory’s ability to understand 
capitalist process. This theory—like all other manifestations of the “new” 
economics—accepts as unproblematic the “universal permanent” character of 
capitalist expectations, markets and governance processes. It is thus inevitable that it 
can say little about possibilities/strategies for ensuring or undermining the continued 
universal permanence of capitalist order. 
Economic theory’s commitment to the non-problemitised universal 
permanence of capitalist order is reflected in its commitment to a premise of 
homogeneity. Economics is inspired by liberal political thought and aspires to 
describe a “pure” economy governed ultimately by Natural Law [Keat (1993)]. In 
this perspective, Riffat is committed to a supposed universal rationality (optimising 
discounted consumption flows over a finite lifetime). Commitment to such 
rationality and the added assumption of competitive equilibrium also implies Riffat's 
awareness of the (total) web of (human and natural) relationships which 
structure/constrain her use of resources.
14 In this sense, a general equilibrium system 
is completely centralised in that the characteristics of the system are in the minds of 
all interacting individuals and they all effectively behave as a single individual 
(Riffat is alone in her own universe). This commitment to homogeneity necessarily 
rules out the possibility of policy effectiveness—as rational expectations based 
models have so often demonstrated. 
Actually existing capitalism (in all its historical stages) is characterised by 
both heterogeneity and coherence. Riffat’s behaviour is often “irrational” (non-
optimising and or based on imperfect information). Yet, there is sustainable 
coherence of behaviour patterns reflected in the normal practices of markets and 
states. Economics explains this coherence by attempts to identify the microeconomic 
foundations of the macroeconomy
15—the macroeconomy is treated effectively as an 
aggregated microeconomy. “Adding up” micro level outcomes and systematically 
ignoring relational complexities at and between economic levels is seen as 
unproblematic by (at least) neo classical economics. 
Twenty first century capitalism is likely to be characterised by increased 
heterogeneity. Differential access to information creates asymmetries of influence 
and power. Moreover, increased externalities are also limiting the homogenisation 
effects of market allocative processes. Regulation theory [Agleitta (1999)] asserts 
14This commitment to homogeneity is retained in socialism for as Oscar Lange has demonstrated 
perfect competition and perfect planning are identical. 
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that coherence in increasingly heterogeneously structured capitalist order is not 
spontaneously maintained by market processes but generated by a specific “mode of 
regulation” characteristic of and appropriate to a specific historical phase of capitalist 
development (Victorian, Fordist, Post Fordist etc.). A “mode of regulation” is a set of 
mediations in a capitalist civil society and state which ensures that structural 
(relational) distortions created by a specific accumulation regime do not destroy 
social coherence within a particular political order 
16. These mediation mechanisms 
validate the pursuit of differentiated individual interests within a system of power 
relationships themselves legitimised by common social objectives. 
17 
Since money is the basis of capitalist order
18 accumulation of capital is the 
accumulation of power – the desire to accumulate money/power infinitely is 
universally dominant in capitalist order. The movement of money capital determines 
the division of labour, structures the employer—employee relationship and 
dominates the private and public lives of both “capitalists” and “labourers”. This 
dominance of money capital is a pre-requisite for assigning relative value to 
economic activities in accordance with their (relative) contribution to accumulation. 
Capitalist order thus requires: 
  (a) Universal dominance of the desire to accumulate capitalist money/power 
19. 
  (b) Continued expectation of increased access to capitalist money/power. 
Subordination to the desire to accumulate takes place most formally at the 
level of the enterprise: This subordination has a collective character. Collectively 
labourers are subordinated to the authority of managers. Collectively managers are 
dependent on consumers. Accumulation necessitates the systematic taking of risks to 
bring about structural changes in the division of labour. Investment risks cannot be 
taken without the enhancement of indebtedness—hence the universality of the 
continual buying and selling of debts and rights to capital use and the evaluation of 
these claims in financial markets within capitalist order. These evaluations are 
speculations on the future. Doubts about solvency of risk takers and their financiers 
may lead to major changes in financial evaluations by firms, banks and macro 
economic managers. Hence sustaining capitalist orders also requires. 
  (a) Efficient mediation to ensure compatibility between financial claims and 
obligations for continuing accumulation. 
Policy is required to ensure the continued existence of (a), (b) and (c). 
Capitalist order is not spontaneously generated in the spheres of production and 
16This has usually taken the form of a nation state in the 19th and 20th centuries.     
17Thus, Keynes recognises both conflict in the interest of financiers and investors and the need to 
reconcile them to move out of a state of less than full employment equilibrium. 
18Treating it as such transforms money into capitalist money [Itoh (1999), pp.101–107].   
19This includes the condition that individuals not regarding money/power accumulation as 
legitimate ends are compelled to participate in accumulation processes as “mustadafeen”.  Social Democratic Reform  1219
finance or within the social sphere, 
20 and it is not self-perpetuating – hence the 
possibility of crises emerging from the non-realisation of (a), (b) and /or (c). Policy 
may be regarded as successful if it strengthens the social dominance of the desire to 
accumulate money/power, facilitates such accumulation by dominant individuals in 
different social groups and articulates an effective debt management strategy. Policy 
is a means for linking different segments of the micro-economy within the context of 
a particular macroeconomic coherence. In capitalism enterprises, (firms and banks) 
are important co-ordinating links between the micro and macro economy. The 
enterprise structures rules of payments, flows of goods and financial relationships 
into a hierarchy relating stake holders with claims/obligations on the collectively 
produced added values. These structures are created by collective and, therefore, 
necessarily political actions. The political nature of the mediation process is a 
reflection of the underlying tension between the continuing need to accumulate and 
the continuing need to legitimise particular forms of accumulation. The maintenance 
of social cohesion requires this continuing legitimisation. 
In the twentieth century, successful mediation has taken the form of creation 
of a high wage society. This has often entailed rising fiscal costs but has given 
collective purpose to the pursuit of private interests. In twentieth century capitalism 
of the “Butskellist” 
21 variety subordination at the level of production of the 
individual worker was legitimised by the provision of collective rights. This form of 
mediation was established not spontaneously but through continuing political 
negotiations between the representatives of capitalists and labourers. This was 
“Fordism”. It entailed  
  (a) Constraining accumulation to integrate labour interests in the accumulation 
process.  
  (b) Increased oligopolistic domination of product and factor markets. 
  (c) Consolidation of trade union strength, proliferation of collective bargaining 
processes and the establishment of the full time, long term wage contract as 
a norm. 
  (d) Restriction on the mobility of capital (through the Bretton Woods regime).  
  (e) Substitution of traditional identities (Christian, Irishman, mother) with new 
identities (trade unionist, manager, professional). Stratification within 
Fordist organisations related social mobility to success in the accumulation 
of power/money. But Fordist hierarchies also restricted social mobility in a 
manner, which reduced uncertainty for both labourers and managers.  
Breakdown of a mediation regime, (say Fordism) may be interpreted as the 
consequence of a break down of interactions between mediation mechanisms which 
are concerned with balancing divergent aspects of regimes of accumulation. Thus, 
20Or within the consciousness of individuals. 
21“Bustskellism” was the Keynesian consensus characteristic of the policy stance of the 
Conservative and Labour parties in Britain during 1951–1964. Ansari and Khan  1220
Fordist organisation facilitated both security and mobility. It was compatible with 
pluralist order, which has space for personal autonomy. But tensions are necessarily 
involved in managing autonomy and subordination and the possibility of the 
emergence of a recurrent sub-optimal equilibrium (recession) or disequilibrium 
(crisis) cannot be ruled out. 
The core of the Fordist regime was the achievement of a stable relationship 
between productivity and wage growth. As Mosley (1999) argues the rate of profit 
and the share of capital in national income remained stable for most OECD countries 
during 1950–73. Social expenditure and associated investments were counter 
cyclical in nature,
22 as were expectations. Fiscal policy swamped the effects of 
monetary policy and investment was highly leveraged. Widespread exchange 
controls meant that government could easily play a policy-coordinating role at the 
national level. The state’s role in the building up of scientific, technical knowledge 
and in the subsidisation of (private) investment risk was of vital importance in 
sustaining Fordism—this involved strict regulation of financial markets and state 
control over financial intermediation processes.
 Finally the Fordist regime strongly 
encouraged consumerism and hoped that the universal adoption of consumption 
expansion oriented lifestyles would strengthen citizenship and labourers’ 
incorporation within capitalism. 
The literature attributes several reasons for the breakdown of Fordist order 
[Lash and Urry (1987); Hirst and Thompson (1997); Agleitta (1999)]. These include 
(a) globalisation of production and financing systems (b) changes in production and 
exchange technology (c) deproletarianisation of the labour class and (d) atomisation 
of social life (and destruction of communities) specially in the OECD countries. 
“Post Fordist” order is characterised by growing full time unemployment, increased 
maldistribution of income (specially in the United States) the spread of consumerism 
to many Third World countries, the growth of part time employment, cheapening of 
the cost of financial and technological transfer processes across national frontiers, 
widening of differentials in inter sectoral productivity growth rates and changes in 
demographic structures. 
Effective mediation processes are required for sustaining “post 
Fordism”—it is not a self sustaining order. Fordist mediation structures are 
collapsing. Mediation within the work process continues with collective 
bargaining being replaced by human resources management. As monopolistic 
competition increases organisational changes in firms and state bureaucratic 
decision-making structures facilitate outsourcing, “automation” and the growth 
of “flexible specialisation”. All these are mediated, not spontaneous, responses. 
A new compatibility between the accumulation regime and the social 
commitment to capital’s hegemony is being created and needs to be sustained. 
There is a continuing need to legitimise. 
22Typically public investment “crowded in” private investment in the Fordist era. Social Democratic Reform  1221
  (a) The subordination of national public transport, energy, communication, and 
financial sectors to international capital. 
  (b) The marketisation of public sector (including nationalised industry) wage 
contracts. 
  (c)  The determination of wage levels within processes of international 
competition leading to a widening of wage differentials in national 
economies. 
  (d) Enhanced systemic mobility of capital (but not of labour since there is no 
relaxation of immigration controls). 
  (e) Abandonment of full employment as a goal of macroeconomic policy.  
  (f)  Abandonment of state regulation of financial markets and increased 
dependence on foreign financial flows. 
23 
  (g) Higher financial returns in both capital and money markets. As institutional 
savings rise and household savings fall the institutional investment manager
 
becomes the dominant influence. He puts a premium on high financial 
returns in the short run and firms are forced to cut wages under threat of 
mergers and leveraged buy-outs. 
  (h)  The dominance of financial markets—and therefore of national 
economies—by non-bank financial intermediaries which specialise in 
dividing risk associated with market finance into their elementary 
components and making them negotiable. Risk sales of this sort have led to 
the emergence of colossal markets in global liquidity. States increasingly 
articulate accommodative macro strategies to fall in line with the 
preferences of these new global financial giants. 
  (i) The growth of individualism and the weakening of the type of collective 
expression of individual aspirations that Fordism facilitated. 
  (j) The new compartmentalisation of the work process associated with the 
increased application of information technology. This has led to an 
individualisation of the effort and remuneration system. Labour market 
uncertainties have increased and career patterns have also been 
individualised. Socio professional and work rules within organisations have 
changed in response to the spread of IT. Worker loyalty to firms has 
declined. Inequalities are assuming an anarchic character.  
 
IV.  SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC REFORMS 
Legitimising post Fordist capitalism requires political medication. Capital 
may be defined as “ever expanding exchange value in the form of pure quantity” 
[Meszaros (1995), p. 115]. This corresponds to the Christian—Islamic concept of 
23This is specially important for the United States which is now a net international debtor and as 
Mosley (1999) argues much of the American growth resilience during the 1990s has been due to high 
foreign capital inflow. Ansari and Khan  1222
avarice/takathur.
24 Capital may also be defined as the concrete form of freedom [Suri 
(1999)]. The enlightenment’s triumph over Christianity is essentially the triumph of 
freedom over love as the purpose of individual and social being. Freedom—a 
continuing self-justifying quest for mastery over creation including most importantly 
the self creation of humanity—is the consensual value of Enlightenment and Post 
Enlightenment social order
25 [Arshad (1999)]. In this sense, neither social democracy 
nor any other intellectual or political movement inspired by enlightenment ontology 
can reject capital for this would amount to a transcendence of freedom in its concrete 
form and submission to God’s will. 
Social democracy thus rejects not capital but certain aspects of capitalism. We 
will now briefly survey the reforms proposed by three leading social democrat 
thinkers to enhance the capacity of the capitalist system to achieve freedom and its 
associated justices
26—these proposals vaccillate between arguments for a 
modification of Post Fordism and a return to Fordism. 
For Habermas actually existing capitalism’s defining characteristic is its 
super-territoriality. He describes the present era is “a post national constellation” 
(1999) and suggests that there is no alternative to post nationalism. In Habermas’ 
view, the greatest failure of this post national capitalism is its production of mass un- 
and under-employment. The state has lost fiscal authority  because politics remains 
national unable to deal effectively with its super-territorial constituents. There must 
now be a democratically legitimised exercise of political power “above” the 
legislative levels of the nation state so that a super-national social contract can be 
constructed and a super-national welfare state willed into being. Habermas pins his 
hope in a federal Europe which will constrain the inequality generating tendency of 
the transnational enterprises and eliminate the need for competition among nation 
states (specially, competitive devaluation) to attract and retain investment. 
Constructing “Federal Europe” in Habermas’ perception must involve both 
the formulation of a new political constitution and the evolution of a distinctively 
European civil society. The constitution must preserve the idea of a self-determining 
community and intellectuals must struggle for the creation of a European public 
sphere. Habermas is aware of the lack of popular enthusiasm for such political 
projects—he laments the “issue less” elections which brought Schroder to power and 
the continuing decline in voter turn out (specially in elections for the European 
parliament). He however, rejects Luhman’s image of a media driven society. The 
public is fragmented and distracted but Habermas asserts it retains a capacity to 
weigh competing arguments. The defense of the public communication sphere which 
24Imam Muhammad Marmaduke Pickthall (1937, p. 941) defines “takathur” as “rivalry in 
worldly increase” combining the Christian conceptions of covetousness (competition) and avarice 
(accumulation). 
25According to Rorty “a liberal society is one which has no ideal except freedom” [in Bhasker 
(1991), p. VII]. 
26Most effectively summarised by Rawls (1971) in his seminal contribution. Social Democratic Reform  1223
links the “public” with decision-makers remains very important. But “meaningful” 
and effective public communication requires that market forces should not dominate 
the communication networks—these networks are replacing the political party as a 
channel of interaction between the “public” and decision takers. 
Habermas accepts the inevitability of mass unemployment. He advocates the 
“redistribution of a lower volume of necessary labour” and shifting the burden of the 
cost of unemployment from the unemployables to “society”. This requires a 
strengthening of  “the egalitarian self-understanding of society”. Opposition to the 
enhanced regulation of society entails a “social fatalist” ideology which legitimises 
the pursuit of individualised purposes in the context of a value free institutional 
network. This is an abandoning of consensual values and hence of democracy.
27 
Habermas’ commitment to a pluralist democracy based upon a respect of the 
“autonomy of the individual” provides the ideological ground for the reforms he 
suggests.
28 
Agleitta endorses the commitment to democratically generated consensual 
values. In his recent reformulation of regulation theory Agleitta (1999) de-
emphasises the role of enterprises as the co-ordinating links between the micro and 
the macroeconomy. Agleitta now regards the history of capitalism as the history of 
the development of a high wage society. Contemporary high wage society faces three 
major problems according to Agleitta (a) globalisation (b) threat to social identity 
and (c) the “shrinking” of the state. New mediation mechanism for reestablishing a 
high growth regime are gradually emerging. The key features of the new system are 
(a) expanded competition specially in labour markets (b) control of enterprises by 
institutional share holders (specially fund managers) and (c) the establishment of 
market valuation as the basic criteria for social success. 
Mediation mechanisms must be evolved to benefit from these “key features”. 
Agleitta suggests that the emergence of institutional funds provide an opportunity for 
the trade union. Trade unions must increase their ownership of company shares. This 
conversion of contractual savings into (collective) property rights will have decisive 
impact on the way enterprises are run and in their investment and employment 
policies. Trade unions could use pension fund ownership to protect management 
from hostile take over bids in return for a corporate strategy which pursues not high 
short term profitability but stable long term returns. With profitability ensured 
collective bargaining—at the level of the enterprises, the industry and the (super 
national) region, could acquire increased saliency. 
27Habermas believes that defending democracy is a common project which links Anglo-Saxon 
analytical philosophy and continental philosophical schools. He regards the work of both Brandon and 
Rorty as fundamentally in the Hegelian tradition (Habermas, forthcoming). 
28According to The Post National Constellation values endorsed by Habermas include (a) respect 
for the particularity of strangers (b) international co-operation (c) autonomy of individuals and plurality of 
identities (d) suspicion of any “rhetoric of the high or the deep” and (e) resistance to the trivialisation of 
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Agleitta also calls for a change in the role of the state to tackle the problem of 
endemic mass unemployment. Training programmes must be designed by 
government to cover the entire working life of each member of the labour force—the 
state must be able to offer employers a labour force with a constantly rising skill 
level. Every labourer must periodically return to the training process, and skills 
acquired must be transferable between enterprises. Job contracts should facilitate 
mobility and this should be used as a means for enhancing workers negotiation skills. 
There should be a deliberate fusion of public and private finance to achieve these 
ends. Capitalism needs an “investing” not a minimalist state. The new “division of 
labour” between capitalism’s public and private spheres calls for an enhanced role 
for the states in the production of technological knowledge 
29 but the utilisation of 
these resources must be left to the private sector. 
Agleitta recognises that his proposed mediation mechanisms are compatible 
with globalisation, the social primacy of markets and the greater mobility of labour. 
They come into play before the operations of the price system. But they are not a 
means for addressing the problem associated with growth of rising inequalities and 
declining social solidarity. Solidarity requires that the nation as a whole take the 
risks that threaten life in society. Agleitta endorses Rawls “difference principle” in 
the statement that “real freedom in a society can be measured only by the resources 
of its poorest member” (1999, p. 54). The disintegration of the Fordist regime of 
accumulation has weakened democracy in the West and there is a need to redefine 
social rights. In Fordism, these were defined with reference to occupational 
solidarity. This solidarity has broken down and there is now a need to assert the 
“right” that exclusion from society cannot be tolerated. Freedom from social 
exclusion must become the categorical imperative of the state and the supreme aim 
of social democracy – Agleitta recognises that this involves significantly higher 
taxation levels. A central concern of the reform movement should be the provisions 
of a minimum income to all which is sufficient to ensure that everyone can 
effectively access Rawls “primary goods”.
30 The agency for creating this new social 
solidarity should be a broad coalition of the single issue movements (eco-feminism, 
animal rights, disarmament, gay rights etc.) which have dominated resistance politics 
in the West in recent years. 
A concern with social solidarity is also central to Rorty (1998). This, in his 
view, can be built only on the basis of renewed “national pride”. Such national pride 
must emphatically reject the view that democracy has become a farce. We “should 
abandon the question; why should we prefer democracy to obedience in favour of the 
question; given the preference we Americans have what should we say about truth, 
knowledge, reason, virtue” (1998, p. 27-28). The preference for democracy needs no 
29Justified by the existence of externalities. 
30According to Agleitta, this guaranteed minimum income should be provided by the state. Its’ 
provision can therefore reduce the wages paid by companies.  Social Democratic Reform  1225
justification and justifies national crimes such as the wholesale massacre of the Red 
Indians
31 and the slaughter of the Vietnamese [Rorty (1998), p. 32]. Social 
democracy must use democratic institutions to serve the cause of “social justice”. 
The concern must be the “combining (of) political freedom with centralised 
economic decision making” [Rorty, p. 79]. Social democrats should target growing 
economic inequality and economic insecurity. Rorty sees possibilities of populist 
revolt in the “prolitarianisation of the Americans bourgeoisie.” (p. 83). 
Rorty believes that “things will get much worse much faster … The world 
economy will soon be owned by a cosmopolitan upper class which has no sense of 
community with any workers anywhere” (p. 85). Rorty also deplores America’s 
growing dependence on foreign capital (p. 86) and increased free trade (p. 88). He 
sees a conspiracy “of the super rich to keep the minds of the population elsewhere—
to keep the bottom 75 percent of Americans busy with ethnic and religious 
hostilities” (p. 88) and fears that fascism may be America’s future (p. 89). “The non 
suburban electorate will decide that the system has failed” [Rorty, p. 91]. Social 
democrats should counter this by (a) putting a moratorium on theory—forgetting the 
awkward questions raised by Lacan, Lyotard and Derida about the multiple 
incoherences characteristic of this type of vulgar communitarianism (b) mobilise 
national pride in being American and (c) concentrate political attention within the 
context of the nation state. This should provide a basis for a people’s charter and an 
alliance with the trade unions. Social democrats should recognise that participatory 
democracy is an illusion and that there is no alternative to capitalism. Piecemeal 
reform within the framework of a market economy should be the main concern of 
social democracy. 
Achieving our Country is a polemic against the very widespread 
disillusionment with liberal democracy in general and “piecemeal reform within the 
framework of a market economy” in particular—this is reflected in books such as 
those by Stephenson (1988) and Jameson (1992) and the rightward shift of the 
Democratic party. This shift is also mirrored in the national programmes of the social 
democratic parties of Blair, Schroder and Jospin. John Gray, one of Europe’s leading 
political thinkers, regards Rorty’s vulgar communitarianism as a “shallow and 
ultimately incoherent perspective” (1998, p. 146). In Gray’s view, capitalism 
undermines itself by unleashing forces that destroy the institutions necessary for its 
survival. He maintains that the Enlightenment project of promoting autonomous 
reason as the basis of morality has proved to be self-destroying. The post-modern 
condition of fractured perspectives and groundless practice brings not just 
disenchantment but threatens the very existence of Western civilisation (1995, Chp. 
2). If globalisation is not checked, Gray believes it will lead to war, impoverishment 
and the break down of social cohesion. Globalisation crucially undermines 
democracy by making social democratic practices (specially Keynesian policies) 
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impossible.
 The free market is remorselessly destroying American social cohesion by 
deepening insecurities and corroding the basic institutions of bourgeois life 
(specially the family). Gray takes comfort from the fact that the United States does 
not have the power to impose a universal free market all over the world. Resistance 
to globalisation is possible but Gray believes that the most likely outcome of the 
American attempt to impose the free market on the rest of the world will be 
increased chaos and disorder, sparking off a wave of social and financial turmoil 
which will eventually engulf the United States. He writes, “global capitalism is 
inherently ungovernable” (1999, p. 209). In Gray’s perspectives, capitalism will not 
survive as a unified global system: Attempts to stamp a free market model on all 
countries by the USA, the Fund and the Bank, will have terrifying consequences: 
Resistance to such attempts through augmenting national autonomy is urgently 
necessary. Nevertheless such resistance will merely create  “a fragmentation of the 
world economy into predatory regional capitalisms” (1999, p. 263). 
Noam Chomsky is equally pessimistic. In his view (1998), the free market is a 
myth. Capitalism today is a “system of administration of markets by collectivist legal 
enterprises—mergers, cartels, corporate alliances—in association with powerful 
states and international bureaucracies which regulate and support private power” 
(1998, p. 5). Chomsky notes that concentration and centralisation of power and 
privilege is growing, union victimisation has increased and wages of two thirds of 
American labour in 1998 were below the 1978 level (1998, p. 12). State initiatives 
remain crucially important for sustaining capitalist profitability and concentration
32 
and “naturally business is delighted with this. The public pays the costs, assumes the 
risk while profits and power are privatised” [Chomsky (1998), p. 14]. 
Increased concentration and centralisation implies that democracy has rising 
costs – hence the continuing resistance to the growth of social spending. Moreover, 
liberalisation of the financial system is a powerful weapon against the welfare state – 
it systemically undermines popular sovereignty and creates what Mahon has called 
“a virtual senate” (1996, p. 10). Mobile capital has the powers to impose its own 
social policy upon the democratic state. Mobile capital—95 percent of which is 
speculative and short term in nature—imposes a low growth, low wage 
macroeconomic strategy specially on developing countries and significantly 
increases their vulnerability to wild fluctuations in world financial markets. Mobile 
capital transfers sovereignty to the giant banks, financial intermediaries and firms, 
which effectively administer the globalised economy. The political power of MNCs, 
international funds and banks, has been greatly increased by the odious debt
33 that 
32Chomsky demonstrates this with reference to the crucially important role of public sector 
investment in the development of the internet, information processing, lasers, satellites and transistors 
(1998, p. 13–14). 
33When the United States colonised Cuba in the late nineteenth century it cancelled Cuba’s debt to 
Spain on the grounds that the debt was imposed upon the people of Cuba without their consent. Legal 
treatises call such debt “odious debt” and recognise “no obligation for the nation. (This debt) is the 
responsibility of the power that has imposed it” [Adams (1991), p. 17]. Social Democratic Reform  1227
has been imposed upon developing countries by the United States the IMF and the 
World Bank [Strange (1998)]. The formal acknowledgment of this transfer of 
sovereignty from the nation state to the corporation is contained in the OECD’s. 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) which is now being championed by the 
IMF. This transfer of political sovereignty from states to international corporations is 
also the primary objective of the amendment to the IMF’s first Article of Agreement 
mandating capital account convertibility. Such a transformation of course makes 
social democratic reform impossible. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Social democracy and its proposed reforms are both necessary and impossible 
(in a Sartrean sense). As Chomsky notes, “the long term goal of modern capitalism 
(is to create) an international political economy which is organised by powerful 
states and secret bureaucracies whose primary function is to serve the concentration 
of power which administer markets through their own internal operations, (and) 
networks of corporate alliances, including the intra-firm transactions that are 
mislabeled “trade”. They rely on the public for subsidy for research and 
development, for innovation and for bailouts when things go wrong. They rely on the 
powerful states for protection from dangerous ‘democracy openings’. In such ways, 
they seek to ensure that the prime beneficiaries of the world's wealth are the right 
people: the smug and prosperous Americans: and their counterparts elsewhere” 
[Chomsky (1998), p. 27]. 
Social democrats such as Agleitta and Rorty argue however that there are 
limits to the constraints that can be imposed on the democratic process. Constraining 
democracy is constraining capital itself—for capital is a concrete form of freedom.
34 
Social democratic reform is necessary in that it sustains faith in freedom through the 
promotion of both consumerism and participation in decision-making processes. 
Thus, space seems to appear for the distributional reforms on the social 
democratic policy agenda. A developing country such as Pakistan clearly gains from 
resisting globalisation and the deceleration of growth, de-industrialisation and the 
financial sector volatility which globalisation entails. Mobilising resistance to 
globalisation cannot be undertaken on social democratic grounds however because 
social democracy does not delegitimise human rights discourse which is now a 
principle instrument for the atomisation of the individual and the destruction of 
collective identities specially in non western societies such as Pakistan. If political 
mediation processes remain dominated by human rights discourse, distributional 
issues will be addressed by poverty alleviation, basic needs type programmes—
sponsored by the agencies of multinational capital. The central purpose of such 
programmes is thwarting the growth of collective rights and identities. The social 
34As Suri (1999, p. 18) argues the circuit of capital is logically complemented by the circuit of 
citizenship since the vote is the abstract form of freedom. Ansari and Khan  1228
democratic agenda becomes irrelevant in such a scenario and countries such as 
Pakistan “leap over” the Fordist phase in the process of subordination to global 
capital. Even in western countries, a return to Fordism seems increasingly unrealistic 
as Lafontanie and Jospin have recently discovered. 
Social democratic reform is impossible for twentieth century experiences have 
shown that accumulation/organisation of capital requires the atomisation/ 
disorganisation of labour. Traditional agencies for implementing social democratic 
reforms—trade unions, political parties, broad fronts, national governments—lose 
authority as capitalism matures: Hence a fundamentally important disjuncture of 
modern capitalism, the national organisation of democracy and the supra state 
organisation of markets cannot be addressed by social democracy—that is why 
despite Habermas’ hopes federal Europe remains a neo liberal project and even 
social democratic parties adopt neo liberal policy stances with respect to European 
integration. This separation of the organisation of markets and states shows that 
growing exclusion and disempowerment of labour is necessary for growing 
concentration and centralisation of capital. 
Nevertheless there are grounds for mobilising the excluded and the 
disempowered  (the mustadafeen) in movements of resistance to capitalism. But such 
movements—unlike social democracy—will have to reject not just capitalism but 
avarice/takathur. They will have to de-legitimise freedom and re-legitimise love as 
the organising principle of human life at the level of both the society and the state.
35 
That however is another story.  
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This paper is a breath of fresh air in the current neo-liberal discourse about 
economic development. Amidst all the talk about productivity, efficiency and good 
governance orchestrated by the international agencies, this paper springs from the 
left field both figuratively and literally. It asks us to stop and ponder over the 
assumptions and models of society and state embedded in the current economic 
paradigm. It builds on the neo-Marxist’s critiques of the evolving economic order. Its 
philosophical approach and erudite arguments are the alarm bells for the conference 
of Pakistan Society of Development Economists. It calls the conferees to stop and re-
examine the premises of their current policy prescriptions. It is an argument to 
promote arguments. 
The argument proceeds on the premise that the capitalist markets are not 
natural outcomes of economic transactions but social constructs consciously 
manufactured, often by the state and its ruling elite. Capitalism is a choice and not 
natural occurrence. How the capitalist processes are being promoted in the late 20th 
Century is illustrated by the analysis of emerging post-Fordist order. The financial 
capitalism of the post-Fordist order requires regulatory support and institutional 
legitimacy. Again the state’s authority is being mobilised to promote capital mobility 
and to dismantle national boundaries. I imagine even the current discourse of 
institutional economics falls in the category of structures that sustain new capitalism. 
Yet the crises of captialism are building up, the paper argues. The free trade, sloshing 
of speculative money around the globe and even the foreign investment all bear 
seeds of crises. 
The last part of the paper brings up social democratic thinkers, Habermas etc., 
and their proposed reforms, to promote an egalitarian social order within the scope of 
markets. It critiques breezily even those models but it does not round off the 
argument with some explanation of what an egalitarian system would look like.  
By and large, the motivation of this paper, to raise questions about the society 
that is being promoted through current economic paradigm, is laudable. It is 
searching for an alternative social order where markets could be brought under the 
rubric of a moral vision. Yet this search is confined to the narrow territory of the new 
left theories. Sen, Gilbraith or Illich, for example, have ideas that suggest a moral 
discipline for the global market, whose laissez-faire includes freedom to speculate 
without restraints. 
The paper certainly calls for not surrendering to the vulgar utilitarianism. It 
raises the age-old issue of individualism versus community. Yet it is also locked 
inside the box it builds. Is the economy primarily a matter of trade, consumption, Mohammad A. Qadeer  1232
distribution and production? Is egalitarian social order realisable regardless of 
cultural, demographic, religious and technological differences among societies? 
What about environmental constraints? The paper does not give even a nod to these 
forces that shape both economy and society. 
This paper is densely packed with premises, allusions and divergences. In 
attempting to draw together various old and new left-theoretical strands, the paper 
becomes one long discursive statement with many loose ends. It could have been 
more focussed by not attempting to touch upon every major proposition and 
presumption of the current economic discourse. 
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